The hypothesis that speculative trading destabilizes or creates a volatile market is frequently debated. To test this hypothesis, we employ a unique dataset from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) on individual positions of speculators. We test whether speculators cause, in a forecasting sense, price movements and volatility in futures markets, and therefore destabilize markets. Our findings provide evidence that speculative trading in futures markets is not destabilizing. To the contrary, speculative trading activity reduces volatility levels.
The role of speculators, in particular hedge funds, in futures markets has been the source of considerable interest and controversy in recent years. The traditional speculative stabilizing theory of Friedman (1953) suggests that profitable speculation must involve buying when the price is low and selling when the price is high. However, this traditional theory is challenged by the theories of noise traders, speculative bubbles and herding, which predict the possibility of prices straying from fundamental values because of the trading behavior of speculators.
The traditional theory predicts that irrational speculators or noise traders, who trade on the basis of irrelevant information, will not survive in the market place. However, Shleifer and Summers (1990) and de Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) show that noise traders might have an impact on prices if they hold a large share of assets regardless of their survival in the long run. This price impact might be even more significant in the presence of herding among these traders. Lux (1995) explains the formation and cyclical behavior of bubbles as self-fulfilling prophecies of market participants, whose readiness to mimic other participants depends on actual returns, rather than irrelevant information, leading to market prices which are different from fundamental value. In this model, a change in investor sentiment from confidence to one lacking confidence would eventually lead to a complete collapse of the bubble.
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The available evidence on whether speculators destabilize the markets is mixed. Speculators, and hedge funds in particular, have been examined in several episodes of financial distress, including the 1992
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis; the 1994 Mexican peso crisis (Fung and Hsieh (2000) ), 2 the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2000) ); and perhaps most famously the financial bailout of Long Term Capital Management (Edwards (1999) ). In some episodes, hedge funds were deemed to have significant exposures and probably exerted market impact, whereas in other episodes they were unlikely to have contributed to destabilization. In their study of hedge funds and the technology bubble, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) concluded that funds did not exert a correcting force on stock prices during the bubble, which leads them to question the efficient market notion that rational speculators always stabilize prices.
In this paper, we analyze the role of speculators, in particular hedge funds, in futures markets. One important development in futures markets in recent years is the increased participation of speculators. In addition to traditional speculators such as hedge funds, other financial institutions, such as commodity swap dealers, have entered commodity futures markets. These institutions view commodities as a distinct asset class and allocate a portion of the portfolios they manage into futures contracts tied to commodity indices. The increased participation of traditional speculators as well as of other financial institutions in futures markets has led to claims that the trading activities of these speculators destabilize markets.
3 Despite these accusations, there has been surprisingly limited research on how speculative trading activity may impact prices and volatility. On the one hand, this is particularly remarkable given the fact that this class of traders is controversial; on the other hand, a lack of data stands in the way of a formal study of speculative trading in markets.
In U.S. futures markets, possible relationships between trader positions and price movements in futures markets have most often been studied by using the highly aggregated public reports published weekly by the CFTC -the so-called Commitments of Traders (COT) reports. Although extant findings are suggestive, researchers generally acknowledge that the CFTC's COT data are highly aggregated;
hence, results from these studies should be interpreted with caution. Recent research using disaggregated data from the CFTC Large Trading Reporting System provides evidence on the relationship between trader positions and price movements. Boyd, Buyuksahin, Haigh and Harris (2009) analyze the existence of herding among hedge funds. They find that the degree of herding in futures markets is similar to that in equity markets and the moderate level of herding in futures markets actually stabilizes prices. 4 We employ the CFTC Large Trader Reporting System, which allows us to identify positions of each trader category in each futures contract for every contract maturity on each day. We use unique, highly disaggregated, precisely defined, position-level data in five different futures markets collected by the CFTC. These markets are: Crude oil and natural gas in energy futures markets, corn in agricultural futures markets, and three-month Eurodollars and mini-Dow in financial futures markets. Choosing commodities and other financial derivatives from different sectors allows us to analyze the role of speculators in a variety of markets. The choice of these markets is uniquely made. Crude oil, natural gas and corn have experienced a sharp increase in price followed by a sudden reduction. We investigate whether these price movements are caused by speculative activity. The three-month Eurodollar contract is the most heavily traded futures contract in the United States (and the second most traded futures contract worldwide). This market is experiencing high volatility because of the current financial crisis. With this contract, we would like to investigate the role of speculative activity in the highly volatile interest rate market. Finally, the mini-Dow is chosen to represent the market-wide overall stock market index. We are, therefore, covering a broad spectrum of assets traded in organized exchanges.
The time period for the data considered in the paper runs from January 2005 until March 2009. We select this time period because it covers two important episodes: (i) the rise and the subsequent decline in commodity prices (especially energy markets); and (ii) the sub-prime mortgage crisis. Our analysis, therefore, provides insight on the role of speculative activity during periods of market stress.
Contrary to common claims, we find that speculative activity does not affect prices. In addition, we find that speculative activity actually reduces volatility. Specifically, we analyze, in a simple multivariate framework, Granger-causality between the daily rate of returns of the above mentioned markets and the daily positions of the five most important categories of market participants in these markets. With the exception of the stock market (mini-Dow), the results show that hedge fund activity does not Grangercause returns. In particular, hedge fund activity does not Granger-cause any other variable in the system; however, it is Granger-caused by the other variables in the system. Our results suggest that, by taking the reverse positions of other market participants, hedge funds provide liquidity to the market.
Furthermore, to assess the impact of speculative activity on risk, we construct realized volatility measures from high-frequency data, and run Granger-causality tests between realized volatility and positions of the five most important trader categories in the five markets considered. We find evidence that swap dealer and hedge fund activities Granger-cause volatility. We therefore analyze impulse response functions, and find that swap dealer and hedge fund activity reduces volatility. This result is of particular importance. Lower levels of volatility imply a reduction in the overall risk of the markets analyzed. The trading activities of swap dealers in commodity markets, as well as the trading activities of hedge funds in all five markets considered in our study stabilize prices, as suggested by Friedman (1953) , and therefore help these markets to perform their risk transfer function. Moreover, we find evidence that hedge funds take the opposite positions of other market participants, therefore providing liquidity to the market. This is in line with Keynes' (1923) view that speculators fill hedgers' demand-supply imbalances and provide liquidity to the market. Our results are also linked to the work of Hirshleifer (1989 Hirshleifer ( , 1990 . In a general equilibrium framework, he shows that speculation lowers hedge premia. We do not measure hedge premia directly. However, we find that speculation activity reduces volatility levels and lower volatility levels reduce the cost of hedging.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section I we describe our data. In section II we analyze contemporaneous correlation between return, volatility, and the five most important categories of market participants in the crude oil, natural gas, corn, three-month Eurodollars and mini-Dow futures markets. In section III we analyze Granger-causality tests between trader positions and rate of return as well as positions and volatility. We conclude in section IV.
I. Data
We select futures contracts that represent a broad spectrum of assets traded in futures markets: energy (crude oil and natural gas), agriculture (corn), interest rates (Eurodollar) and stocks (mini-Dow).
We analyze a considerable amount of data covering the period from This is particularly true for energy and agricultural markets. In fact, at the beginning of our sample, the futures price of crude oil is just over $42, then reaches the staggering price of $146 in July 2008, and returns to $42 at the end of our sample (see Figure 1 , row 1). Natural gas also experiences great price variability during our sample. Prices increase from $6 to $15 at the end of 2005, and then return back to $6 in 2006, rise again to $13 in 2008 and settle below $4 in March 2009 (see Figure 1 , row 2). The corn market also experienced a sharp increase in price (from $5 to $16), followed by a sharp decline. Many have attributed these price movements to speculative activity.
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For each market analyzed, we use three different data sets: 1) daily futures rate of returns; 2) high frequency transaction data, which we employ for computing realized volatility measures; and 3) data on daily net futures positions of the most important categories of market participants in each market.
We use futures market data for several reasons. First, futures prices are readily available on a tick-bytick basis. Second, the contracts we analyze are very actively traded, and transaction costs are lower in futures markets. Third, the CFTC collects data on the market participants' positions for futures and options but not for the cash market. Fourth, numerous studies find that futures markets tend to lead cash markets in terms of price discovery. 7 This last point is very important as we focus on the impact of speculative activity on prices and volatilities.
For each market we concentrate on the nearby contract (closest to delivery). Before maturity (the expiration date), market participants roll over their positions from the nearby contract (March 2005, say) to the next-to-nearby contract (June 2005) . This behavior generates some type of seasonality in the data.
To mitigate these problems, the roll-over strategy adopted in this paper is to switch to In what follows we describe the data in some detail. in excess of three. The negative first-order autocorrelation indicates mean reversion. Natural gas exhibits a significant negative average daily return (-47% annually) and a very large standard deviation (the largest of the five markets). The unconditional distribution of the daily rate of returns on natural gas is non-Gaussian. Corn displays the highest average daily rate of return over the sample (6.3% annually). The standard deviation dominates the mean and the unconditional distribution is close to a Gaussian. Not surprisingly, the Eurodollar interest rate has a very low standard deviation and daily average close to zero.
A. Futures Market Return Data
The Eurodollar returns also exhibit significant first order autocorrelation and excess kurtosis. Returns on the mini-Dow have negative daily average (11% annually), negative skew and excess kurtosis. The standard deviation of futures returns on the mini-Dow is higher than that of the Eurodollar but lower than that of energy products and corn, confirming that, over our sample, commodity markets experience large price variations. The negative return for the mini-Dow is mainly due to the sub-prime crisis and the ensuing recession.
B. High Frequency Transaction Data
To construct realized volatility measures, we obtained transaction data from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. At the end of each trading day, the CFTC receives data on all transactions that occurred in futures and options directly from the exchanges.
For crude oil and natural gas, we consider transactions in both the electronic platform and the traditional pit. Energy markets started to trade electronically on September 5 th 2006. After that day, most transactions take place on the electronic platform. However, 30 percent of volume is still traded on the pit.
Therefore, we constructed realized volatility measures considering all transactions that took place between 9:00 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. EST (see Table I ).
In the corn market we only utilize electronic transactions that took place between 10:30 a.m. Table I ). The median intertrade duration for all the markets analyzed is less than one second.
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The use of high frequency data for constructing realized volatility measures could be problematic given the bias produced by market microstructure noise. Several solutions have been proposed to overcome this problem. In this paper we follow three approaches. Barndorff-Nielsen, Hansen, Lunde, and Shephard (2008) propose a kernel estimator where the bias correction is achieved by taking into account the autocorrelation structure of high frequency data. The second approach we follow is that of Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001) where the bias correction is achieved by sampling at relatively lower frequencies. The last approach we implement is developed by Zhang, Mykland, and Aїt-Sahalia (2005) and is referred to in the literature as two scales realized volatility (TSRV). The results of our analysis are qualitatively the same regardless of the realized volatility estimator adopted. To conserve space, we only report results for the two scales realized volatility estimator. 12 Here we describe this estimator in some detail and to do so we need to introduce some notation. The two scales realized volatility estimator is quite simple. Starting from the first observation, set m=300 transactions, for example, and compute RV using equation (1). Then, starting from the second observation re-compute RV using equation (1) (m is unchanged). In this way, even if m is set to a given sampling frequency, we still make use of all available observations (transactions). We then average the realized volatility estimators obtained on the subintervals. Sampling at a relatively lower frequency (say, 5-minute, in calendar time, or every 300 transactions in transaction time) dramatically reduces the effect of market microstructure noise. This benefit is now retained, while the variation of the estimates will be lessened by 11 Our high frequency data contain information up to the second, but actual transactions are recorded in hundredths of a second (centiseconds) or thousands of a second (milliseconds). 12 Results for the other realized volatility estimators are available from the authors. the averaging. When applying equation (1) to all observations (i.e. sampling at the highest possible frequency, m=1), we obtain a consistent estimate of the variance of the market microstructure noise. The last step in the two scales realized volatility estimator is to correct for the bias of the noise, by subtracting from the average estimator the noise variance
where k denotes the number of subintervals of size m and, therefore, the number of realized volatilities computed using equation (1) We, therefore, compute the two scales realized volatility measure in transaction time (for example, sampling every 300 transactions). In order to implement equation (2), we need to choose m, the sampling frequency. Volatility signature plots 13 provide valuable information about the bias in RV measures in (1) and about optimally choosing m in order to correct that bias. For each asset, we construct volatility signature plots for each month in our sample and then select m optimally.
14 Figure 1 depicts prices and two scales realized volatility measures for the five assets analyzed in the paper. Crude oil, interest rates (Eurodollar) and the stock market (mini-Dow) exhibit high volatility in the last part of our sample. We may conjecture that these markets are strongly linked to the overall status of the economy. The uncertainty about the sub-prime crisis and the recession is clearly evident in the volatility of these assets. Natural gas and corn exhibit high variability throughout our sample. Table II , column 2, provides descriptive statistics for RV. Energy and corn markets both show a very high average volatility and a high variation in volatility levels. This is not surprising, given that we are indeed covering the period where commodity markets experience dramatic price changes. The lowest volatility is in the Eurodollar market. All realized volatility measures are stationary and highly persistent.
C. Market Participants' Positions
The CFTC monitors U.S. futures and options on futures markets through its market surveillance program, and since the 1920s, the CFTC (and its predecessors) has been utilizing the central tool of market surveillance known as the Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS). Following the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), the CFTC collects and stores data on the positions of traders that hold contracts above 13 Volatility signature plots show average daily realized volatility measures, computed using equation (1), against sampling frequencies m -see Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2000) . 14 Details on this procedure can be obtained from the authors. Two categories of market participants warrant further discussion: commodity swap dealers and hedge funds. We start with the latter.
There is no consensus on the exact definition of a hedge fund in futures markets and the CEA, the statute governing futures trading, does not define hedge funds. 18 Accordingly, there is not a requirement that hedge funds be categorized in the LTRS. Despite this, many hedge fund complexes are registered as Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs), 19 Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs), 20 and/or Associated Persons 15 These large trader reporting levels include crude oil, 350 contracts; natural gas, 200 contracts; corn, 250 contracts; Eurodollar, 3,000 contracts; and mini-Dow, 1,000 contracts. 16 Occasionally, the CFTC will raise or lower the reporting levels in specific markets with the objective of striking a balance between maximizing effective surveillance and minimizing the reporting burden on the futures industry. 17 Specifically, a reportable trader is classified as commercial by filing a statement with the CFTC (using the CFTC Form 40) that he is commercially "…engaged in business activities hedged by the use of the futures and option markets." However, to ensure that the traders are classified consistently and with utmost accuracy, CFTC market surveillance staff in the regional offices checks the forms and re-classifies the trader by collecting further information about the trader's involvement in the markets. 18 However, the SEC notes that a hedge fund is an 'entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose interests are not sold in a registered public offering and which is not registered as an investment company under the Investment Company Act" (p.3. SEC, 2003) . 19 "Commodity Pool Operator (CPO): A person engaged in a business similar to an investment trust or a syndicate and who solicits or accepts funds, securities, or property for the purpose of trading commodity futures contracts or commodity options. The commodity pool operator either itself makes trading decisions on behalf of the pool or engages a commodity trading advisor to do so." Source: Glossary of the CFTC (http://www.cftc.gov/educationcenter/glossary/index.htm). 20 "Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA): A person who, for pay, regularly engages in the business of advising others as to the value of commodity futures or options or the advisability of trading in commodity futures or options, or issues analyses or reports concerning commodity futures or options."
(APs), 21 who may control customer accounts. In addition to these three categories of traders, market surveillance staff at the CFTC identifies other participants who are not registered in any of these three categories but are known to be managing money (MM). These four categories combined are defined as being the hedge fund category (see bottom of Exhibit 1 in the appendix). We actually check the names of the funds in these four categories with those listed as hedge funds in press reports, and we find that many of the large CPOs, CTAs, APs and MMs are generally considered to be hedge funds and hedge fund operators. As such, and to conform to the academic literature and common financial parlance, we refer to these four categories collectively as hedge funds.
In commodity markets, commercial commodity swap/derivatives dealers (henceforth, swap dealers), Table II we analyze net futures positions of market traders, in Table III we concentrate on the long and the short components of trader positions. Dealers and merchants (AD) are primarily short. This is in line with the needs of these market participants to hedge their positions in the underlying commodity. Swap dealers hold 40 percent of the long positions in all commodities analyzed.
Interestingly, hedge funds hold large positions in all five markets, and they are present on both sides of the market (long and short positions). The last column of We proceed with the correlation analysis.
II. Unconditional Contemporaneous Correlation
We begin our preliminary analysis of the relationship between returns, volatility, and trader positions by computing correlation coefficients. Table IV reports correlation coefficients between returns, realized volatilities, and the positions of the five categories of traders analyzed for each market. The top number refers to the positions in levels, while the bottom number refers to the change in positions. Positions for dealers/merchants (AD) are negatively correlated with rate of returns of crude oil, natural gas and corn.
AD positions are also negatively linked to the volatility of crude oil but positively linked to the volatility of natural gas and corn. There is no evidence of a contemporaneous link between swap dealer positions, either in levels or first difference, and rate of returns. Swap dealer activity seems to move in the opposite direction of volatility in the corn and the natural gas markets, but is positively linked to volatility levels in the crude oil market. Hedge funds have a positive correlation with returns. This implies that hedge fund positions move in the same direction as the market. It is also interesting to note that hedge fund activity is negatively linked to volatility. An increase in hedge fund activity is associated with lower volatility levels. Finally, hedge fund activity is negatively linked to the positions of the other traders. This may suggest that by taking the opposite position with respect to the other market traders, hedge funds may provide liquidity to the market. This is in line with the theory of speculation as described in Keynes (1923) , which postulates that speculator positions should offset any imbalance of hedger positions.
The simple correlation analysis provides three main results. First, swap dealer activity is not contemporaneously correlated with returns and is negatively linked to volatility. Second, hedge fund activity is positively correlated with returns but negatively correlated with volatility. Third, the correlation between hedge fund positions and positions of the other market traders is always negative. The same result also holds for swap dealers.
III. Granger-Causality Analysis
We test for Granger causality in the context of Vector AutoRegression (VAR) models. Since the variables exhibit heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we estimate VAR models using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Newey-West robust standard errors. We estimate four different sets of VARs. In the first we consider rate of returns and positions in levels; in the second we employ rate of returns and change in positions; in the third we utilize volatility and positions in levels; in the last we consider volatility and change in positions. 27 We only report results for the optimal lag-length. 28 However, we would like to emphasize that these results are very robust and hold regardless of the lag structure in the VAR. we are particularly interested in testing whether swap dealer activity and hedge fund activity are Grangercausal for returns and volatility. The null hypothesis is that of Granger-non-causality -a p-value greater than 5 percent indicates failure to reject the null.
A. Crude Oil
Panels A and B in Table V refer by the other variables in the system and Granger-cause these variables. 27 We only report results for net futures positions. However, we perform the same analysis also for long futures positions, short futures positions and net total (futures and options) positions. 28 We select the optimal lag-length using a series of Wald tests (i.e. testing for the significance of the parameters of each lag). Given the problems of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in our data, we could not rely on standard Akaike (AIC) and Schwartz Information Criteria (SIC). Wald tests do not pose any penalty to less parsimonious specifications, unlike AIC and SIC. Therefore, the optimal lag-length selected is always higher than that selected by AIC and SIC. However, the results do hold even when using AIC and SIC.
The last two panels in Table V report Granger-causality tests for volatility and trader positions (panel C refers to positions in levels while panel D refers to change in positions). A stylized empirical finding in the realized volatility literature is that logarithmic realized standard deviation is approximately Gaussian.
Our realized volatility measures confirm this finding. In fact, in modeling realized volatility measures in the context of VARs, it is customary to use logarithmic realized standard deviation -e.g. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (2003) . In our analysis we use the three measures of realized volatility described in Section I and their logarithm realized standard deviations counterparts. To conserve space, we only report results for logarithmic two scales realized standard deviation in transaction time.
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Panels C and D show that positions, including those of swap dealers and hedge funds, Granger-cause volatility. There is also a feedback effect from volatility to traders' positions. Therefore, it seems that swap dealer and hedge fund trading, among other traders, is moving volatility levels in the crude oil market. To further investigate this issue, we compute impulse responses. Pesaran and Shin (1998) proposed a technique, termed generalized impulse responses, which is invariant to the ordering of the variable in the VAR and does not require shocks to be orthogonal. Assume that there is a one-standard deviation shock to the k-th variable, generalized impulse responses are then computed by applying a variable specific Cholesky factor which is derived by placing the k-th variable at the top of the Cholesky ordering. Figure 2 , row 1, depicts generalized impulse responses of volatility to one standard deviation innovation in the level of traders' positions in the crude oil futures market, for the VAR with 5 lags. 30 We are particularly interested in the response of volatility to a standard deviation shock to commodity swap dealer activity and hedge fund activity. The second column in row 1 indicates that swap dealers have no impact on volatility. Interestingly, the fourth column in row 1 provides evidence of a short-lived and statistically significant reduction in volatility. In other words, a shock in hedge fund activity reduces volatility. It is also worth noting that positions of dealers and merchants (hedgers) have a positive impact on volatility levels (i.e. they increase volatility). We conjecture that dealers and merchants (AD) are likely to be informed traders. Bringing information to the market might generate higher volatility.
We also compute impulse responses using the classic Cholesky decomposition which is very sensitive to the order of the variables in the VAR. To mitigate this problem we consider several orderings of the variables and always find results similar to those reported above.
31 29 Our results are robust to the different measures of realized volatility considered. 30 This is the optimal lag-length. Generalize impulse responses for VARs with 1-4 lags are very similar to those reported in Figure 2 . Response standard errors are computed with 1,000 Monte Carlo replications in EViews 6. On the horizontal axis is the number of days after the shock, in this instance 10 days. 31 Impulse responses using the classic Cholesky decomposition are also calculated for all the other markets studied in this paper. Results from Cholesky decomposition are similar to generalized impulse responses; therefore we do not report them. 0.000 for change in positions). There is also evidence that the system is Granger-causing hedge fund activity, but hedge fund activity is not Granger-causing the system. It seems that hedge funds are reacting to market conditions, and there is no indication that hedge fund activity is moving prices and/or positions of other traders. These results are qualitatively similar to those obtained in the crude oil market.
B. Natural Gas
Panel C in Table VI shows Granger-causality tests for volatility and positions in levels. Volatility is Granger-caused by traders' positions (p-value 0.016), including hedge funds. There is no evidence of a feed-back effect from volatility to trading activity (p-value 0.633). On the other hand, it appears that dealers and merchants (AD) and producers (AP) increase volatility levels. In line with the results for crude oil, we may infer that dealers, merchants and producers convey information to the market.
The last panel in Table VI refers to Granger-causality tests for volatility and change in trader positions. The results suggest that volatility is marginally not Granger-caused by trading activity (p-value 0.052) and does not Granger-cause trading activity (p-value 0.344). Similar to our findings in the crude oil market, there is evidence that hedge fund trading is Granger-caused by the trading of the other market participants but is not causing, in a forecasting sense, any variable in the system. Figure 3 , row 2, confirms our findings. In fact, hedge fund activity does not have any impact on volatility (fourth graph); swap dealers seem to slightly reduce volatility (second graph); while dealers and merchants seem to increase volatility levels.
C. Corn
Rate of returns on corn appear to not be affected by trader positions and by the change in trader positions.
In fact, Table VII shows that returns are not Granger-caused by the trading activity of the five largest categories of traders. Similar to the results for the energy market, hedge fund activity is Granger-caused by the system but does not Granger-cause the system. This is also true for swap dealer activity in panels B (change in positions).
There is evidence of a feedback effect between volatility and trader positions. Hedge fund activity is non-causal for the system (p-values 0.070 and 0.148 in Table VII, 
D. Eurodollar
Since Similar to the results for crude oil and natural gas, it seems that volatility in the Eurodollar market is
Granger-caused by trading activity (p-value 0.025). In particular, there is evidence that hedge fund activity is causal to volatility (p-value 0.007). To further investigate this issue, we compute generalized impulse responses. Figure 3 , row 4, shows that four of the five trader categories (including hedge funds) have no effect on the Eurodollar volatility, while commercial arbitrageurs and brokers/dealers (FA) seem to reduce risk in this market.
E. Mini-Dow
The last market we analyze is the mini-Dow. In this market we have two hedge fund categories:
hedgers (commercial FH) and speculators (non-commercial HF). It is interesting, then, to compare how hedge funds behave when entering the market for different purposes.
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The results for this market are, in part, different from those obtained in the other markets analyzed. In fact, rates of return (see Table IX , panels A and B) are Granger-caused by trader positions. This is a 32 During our sample, futures-only three-month Eurodollars open interest declined from a peak of 12 million contracts to 9 million contracts. 33 Among the five markets analyzed, commercial hedge funds hold significant positions only in the mini-Dow. Speculative hedge fund activity has a positive impact on returns in the sense that it increases return levels.
During the time period analyzed, the Dow index first increases from a level of 10,750 to 14,200 in the second half of 2007, and then declines after the beginning of the sub-prime crisis and reaches 6,500 at the end of our sample. On average, the Dow experienced a negative return over our sample (11% on an annual basis). The trading activity of speculative hedge funds (HF) and commercial arbitrageurs and brokers/dealers (FA) contributes to reverse the negative trend. On the other hand, commercial financial institutions (FO) and floor brokers/traders (FBT) appear to contribute to the trend. 34 Interestingly, commercial hedge funds (FH) exhibit no significant impact on returns.
Now we turn our attention to the volatility of the mini-Dow. Table IX , panels C and D, show that volatility is Granger-caused by positions (including those of commercial and non-commercial hedge funds) but not vice versa. In line with the results for volatility dynamics described above, speculative hedge fund activity reduces volatility. It is interesting to contrast the graphs in the last two rows of
Figures 2 and 3. Traders that increase rate of returns and reverse the trend (speculative hedge funds and arbitrageurs and brokers and dealers), decrease volatility; while traders that decreased returns (financial others), have a net positive effect on volatility. According to the theory of Friedman (1953) , a speculator should buy when the price is falling and sell when the price is rising. This implies a trend reversal.
Speculative hedge fund activity in this market does seem to reverse the trend. Moreover, speculation from hedge funds reduces the risk level in this market. We also notice a difference between the effects of trading activity of commercial hedge funds (hedgers) and non-commercial hedge funds (speculators). The latter category reverses the trend and reduces volatility levels while the former does not have any significant effect on returns and volatility.
F. Main Findings
Is speculation activity causing price movements in energy, agricultural, and financial markets?
The analysis of Granger-causality between returns and trader activities yields two main results. speculative hedge fund activity has a positive impact on a bearish market. Therefore, the answer to the above question is "no" for most markets analyzed; when we have evidence of a causal effect on returns, we find that speculation activity actually reverses the trend. Second, hedge fund activity is not Grangercausal to returns and/or positions of other market traders, but it is Granger-caused by the other variables in the system. These results are particularly important for the issue we analyze in this paper. In fact, they suggest that speculation activity does not destabilize prices, even in markets and times when prices reach historical highs. Speculation activity in general, and hedge fund activity in particular, seem to be responsive to market conditions but are not moving the market, nor are they generating trading activity from other traders. We are aware that Granger-causality tests have limitations. However, our results are very robust. Using different data filtrations (levels and first differences) and different VAR specifications, we always find that speculation activity does not move prices and, in the case of hedge funds, does not cause trading activity by other market participants.
Is speculation activity increasing risk? It is possible that speculation activity may have no impact on prices, but it might have an impact on market volatility. With the exception of the corn market, we find that trading activity Granger-causes volatility. In particular, there is evidence of causality from hedge fund activity to volatility. Further investigation, via generalized impulse responses, shows a statistically significant reduction in volatility. In other words, a shock in hedge fund activity reduces volatility. These results are very robust. In fact, we adopt three measures of realized variance and three measures of logarithmic realized standard deviation, and find that if hedge fund activity is causal, in a Granger sense, for volatility, this causal relationship implies that hedge fund trading reduces volatility levels. Similar results also apply to commodity swap dealers in the crude oil and natural gas markets. Less volatile markets are more attractive and have a lower hedge premia, as predicted by Hirshleifer (1989 Hirshleifer ( , 1990 .
IV. A Closer Look t the Relationship Between Volatility and Trader Positions
The concept of Granger-causality is based on a precise temporal structure: we test whether a variable at time t helps predicting another variable in the next period, t+1. However, given that the market analyzed are very active, it is reasonable to assume that the causation might occur within the same time interval -a day in our setup. Taking into account the potential endogeniety of trading activity, we test for a contemporaneous casual relationship between realized volatility and traders' positions.
The main challenge in identifying the casual relationship between traders' positions and volatility is the potential endogeneity of traders' positions. In particular, although one may conjecture, as it has been often alleged, that speculation activity may increase volatility levels, it is also plausible that speculation activity may be a function of the level of volatility. For instance, high volatility may induce sophisticated speculators to increase their market participation.
Therefore, it is difficult to determine the direction of the bias in an OLS regression of volatility on traders' positions. To deal with this endogeneity issue we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach.
We are interested in estimating the following equation
where RV i,t is the (log) realized volatility, 35 i=1,…,5 represents the five markets analyzed, TP i,j,t is the trading positions of trader j in market i at time t, ε i,t is an error term which assumed to be uncorrelated with lag values of realized volatility but not necessarily with TP i,j,t . The large number of lags of RV i,t accounts for the strong serial correlation in volatility and covers the trading days of the past month.
We are particularly interested in the parameter β i which measures the impact of trading activity on volatility. However, given that TP i,j,t and ε i,t may be correlated because of the endogeneity, simple OLS estimates of β i may be biased. To overcome this problem we need to adopt a set of instruments which are correlated with TP i,j,t but uncorrelated with ε i,t .
The instrument we propose is the number of reporting traders in each market each day, NT i,j,t . fund activity has always a negative impact on volatility -i.e. it reduces volatility levels. The same also applies to swap dealers. These results are in line with the Granger-causality analysis above.
Interestingly commercial dealers and merchants (AD) increase volatility. Non-commercial floor brokers and traders seem to increase volatility and significantly so in crude oil and mini-Dow. In the mini-Dow market it is also worth noting that commercial financial institution also increase volatility levels. 35 We adopt the three measures of realized volatility described in section I.B. 36 In order for the actual size of the LIML test to be no greater than 10% (15%), the F-statistics should exceed 16.38 (8.96).
V. Conclusion
We employ a unique dataset that allows us to precisely identify positions of market participants in five futures markets. By adopting a very simple but well-established technique, Granger-causality, we investigate whether speculation activity is moving prices and increasing volatility. In general, we find that speculation activity is not causing any price movement, it actually reduces risk. We are not ruling out the possibility that a single trader (of any category of market participants) might implement trading strategies that move prices and increase volatility. However, as a whole, speculation does not seem to destabilize futures markets. The role of speculation activity in financial markets is very important because it allows hedgers to find counterparties to hedge their positions and, in general, it allows markets to perform their institutional role. Therefore, speculators, in general, and hedge funds, in particular, should not be seen as sinful agents. In fact, we find that speculative trading activity has beneficial effects on markets. 
